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For the first time, a Hungarian judge stayed proceedings to ask the CJEU preliminary
questions about the independence of Hungarian courts. The questions concern
the appointment of court presidents and the low salary of judges. The response of
Hungarian authorities was quick: Within a week, the Prosecutor General requested
the Kúria (Hungary’s Supreme Court) to review the reference with the possible effect
of deterring other judges from asking similar questions. This first post will analyse the
preliminary questions, while the second post will illustrate the emerging constitutional
crisis within the Hungarian judiciary.
The Hungarian Government has long been criticised for undermining judicial
independence. Domestic actors, the European Parliament, the GRECO, the
Venice Commission and many others have continuously expressed concerns
over the threats to judicial independence since 2012, when a new system of court
administration was introduced in Hungary with centralised powers for one person,
the President of the National Judicial Office (NJO), Ms Tünde Handó. The NJO
President has broad powers over, among others, the recruitment and promotion of
judges, budgeting and training. The NJO President must be a judge, but otherwise
she is an external actor to the judiciary. She is fully dependent on the legislative
branch, while the judiciary has no practical means to control her: she was elected
by Parliament for nine years without hearing the opinion of the Judicial Council, she
has to report to Parliament and, if she abuses her powers, only the Parliament may
remove her.
Criticism has increased in the last one and a half years since the newly elected
members of the National Judicial Council, the Hungarian judiciary’s self-governing
body, pledged to scrutinize Ms Handó’s activity more thoroughly (see more in Part
II). In short, since 2018, the Judicial Council has issued several reports detailing
the long list of legal provisions the NJO President has violated. In turn, the NJO
President declared the Judicial Council ‘illegitimate’, declined to cooperate, and
initiated attacks against the Council and its members. For example, Ms Handó
labelled Council members as “traitors of the homeland” for informing international
partners, such as the European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary on the
situation. She also declined to grant access to documents and blocked payments
of the Council (which she could do because the Judicial Council does not have a
budget of its own and is financially dependent on the NJO which it is supposed to
control). After the Council signalled the problems a number of times to the NJO
President and to the public without result, on 8 May 2019 the Judicial Council
requested Parliament to remove the NJO President for not complying with her
statutory obligations. The pro-government majority, however, protected Ms Handó
and turned down the request without debate and without refuting the Council’s
claims. Altogether, the Parliament spent three minutes on the issue.
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The clash of the NJO President and the Judicial Council has raised concern across
Europe: this year’s country-specific recommendations of the Council within the
European Semester noted that “[t]he National Judicial Council faces increasing
challenges in counter-balancing the powers of the President of the National Office
for the Judiciary. Questions have been raised regarding the consequences of this for
judicial independence.” The European Association of Judges described the situation
more bluntly by saying that "[i]n general, one can say that the Hungarian Judiciary is
facing a kind of ‘constitutional crisis’”, while Thomas Markert, Secretary of the Venice
Commission stated that from a rule of law viewpoint, the powers of the President of
the National Judicial Office are “the most problematic” in Hungary.
Judicial self-governance
Mr Csaba Vasvári, who is a member of the National Judicial Council referred three
questions to the CJEU in his order of 11 July 2019. A Swedish national allegedly
misused ammunition in Hungary in 2015, and charges were brought against him.
The first preliminary question is about the human rights aspects of the case and
addresses the lack of an effective quality assurance system for translations and
interpretation and relates to Directive 2010/64/EU. The issue is of crucial importance
from the point of view of safeguarding the fairness of criminal procedures, but it is
not related to judicial independence, therefore it is not detailed here.
The second question challenges the powers of the NJO President: the referring
judge asks whether it is acceptable under EU law that court presidents are appointed
in a manner that circumvents the provision prescribing a vote by judges on the
candidates, which should be taken into account by the NJO President. Selecting
court presidents is a strong power of the NJO President, because court presidents
have broad authority: court presidents evaluate the work of judges which determine
the progress of their careers; they are entitled to launch disciplinary proceedings;
and court presidents influence the everyday working conditions of individual judges,
such as the number of assistants. Court presidents can also influence the fate of
individual cases as they issue the case allocation scheme of the court, and court
leaders dependent on the court president determine which case goes to which
judge. This is extremely important because there is no automatic case allocation in
Hungary which makes allocating cases an effective method to indirectly influence
the outcome, as an expert noted. In some cases, certain powers extend to lower
courts: the referring court, the Central District Court of Pest (Budapest), for example,
belongs to the Metropolitan Court (Budapest), and the latter’s president has wide
powers over the judges of the referring court.
The general rules for appointing a court president include a vote by the judges of
the specific court and the NJO President can only appoint someone if he or she
is supported by the majority of judges. If the NJO President wishes to appoint an
applicant not supported by the judges, she must seek the consent of the National
Judicial Council. This is a method to secure judges’ participation in the selection
process. The problem is that the NJO President has the power to annul the entire
call and render the appointment procedure unsuccessful without the consent of
any judicial body, and in this case she might appoint an interim court president
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for up to one year. At the Metropolitan Court, where the requesting court belongs,
the NJO President rendered the last three calls unsuccessful and as a result the
court has had no permanent president since January 2018. The National Judicial
Council found that the NJO President violated the law with the practice of repeatedly
annulling – often without any proper justification – calls for applications where the
result of the judicial vote on candidates was not to her liking.
The essence of the question is thus whether a judge can be deemed independent
if a court president is appointed by disregarding the vote of the judges when this
president has wide powers. The case is also interesting because the referring judge
himself was one of the judges who had applied for a higher position but the NJO
President rendered the call unsuccessful without reasons. Moreover, the former
interim president of the Metropolitan Court, appointed by the NJO President, initiated
disciplinary proceedings against Judge Vasvári. The National Judicial Council did not
give its consent which is necessary for a procedure against its members. Also, the
current interim president joined an open letter of court presidents in which they called
on all members of the National Judicial Council to resign.
The salary of judges
The third question relates to the remuneration of judges and asks the CJEU to
determine whether the salary of Hungarian judges is high enough to guarantee
independence. Unlike in the ASJP or the Carlos Escribano Vindel cases, there was
no direct cut of the judges’ salary in Hungary, instead there has not been a raise
for fifteen years which has led to a low level of judges’ income compared to the
average wage. While in 2004 the basic pay for judges was 2.09 times higher than
the average pay, in 2019 the ratio is only 1.23. The preliminary reference argues
that inflation and the general development of the economy together with the lack of a
general raise has resulted in a comparatively low level of salary for judges.
The first interesting aspect of the question is that to compensate for the low basic
pay, extra payments can be granted by the NJO President and by court presidents
selected by her. The amounts of these extra payments are significant for a judge,
on average they equal several months’ pay in a year. The National Judicial Council
strongly criticised this practice of bonuses and payments for project work, because
these are discretionary and non-transparent payments and thus undermine judicial
independence: without an adequate basic pay, judges cannot feel secure to decide
against the assumed will of their superiors. A second interesting aspect of the
reference is that it argues that since September 2018, prosecutors have been
earning more than judges, a sharp change because for a long time the salary of
the two groups moved together. In ASJP and Carlos Escribano Vindel, the CJEU
accepted salary reduction for judges in part because these were general measures
in the public administration. As for Hungary, the referreing judge argues, the raise
for prosecutors serves as an example to the comparatively low level of judicial wage.
The reference cites the Prime Minister’s Chief of Staff who said this year that the
salary of judges was ‘derogatory’ and there were plans to increase judicial pay as
of 2020. However, there is still no legislation tabled on the topic and next year’s
budget proposal does not suggest a raise for judges. This is highly problematic as
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by keeping judicial salaries at such a low level, the executive and legislative branch
acquires a very strong ‘blackmailing’ potential over the judiciary.
The Prosecutor General challenges the questions
Just a week after the preliminary reference was initiated, on 19 July 2019, the
Prosecutor General announced that he requested a review of the preliminary
reference order. The special appeal used by the Prosecutor General is only available
for him and he tries to acquire a declaration from the Kúria that the preliminary
reference is unlawful. This will not stop the reference from reaching Luxembourg
but might have a chilling effect among judges because of the high prestige of the
Kúria. The Prosecutor General argues that none of the questions raise genuine
issues: the first question is not important because in the specific case there was no
problem relating to translation or interpretation. As to the second and third questions
regarding the abuse of powers by the NJO President in appointments and the salary
of judges, the Prosecutor General suggests that these are irrelevant for the case
at hand. It is important to note that the Prosecutor General is a close ally of Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán, and he honoured Ms Handó, the NJO President, with the
“Pro Cooperatione” (For Cooperation) award only this June. The CJEU has a long
list of judgments emphasising that every judge has the right to submit preliminary
questions and superior national courts cannot deprive inferior courts from this right,
but if the Kúria agrees with the Prosecutor General, the chilling effect might be
significant and deter other judges from submitting questions to the CJEU on judicial
independence.
The second and third questions on judicial independence might seem remote from
the actual case but the judge argues that if the independence of Hungarian courts is
undermined, the defendant might challenge any decision before international fora.
The judge also claims that there is no permanent and lawfully appointed president
of the higher court where he belongs, and the interim president has wide powers to
influence judges, including him, while the low salary undermines the independence
of all Hungarian judges and courts.
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